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Abstract 
In the present contribution we examine the link between societal crisis situations and belief in 
conspiracy theories. Contrary to common assumptions, belief in conspiracy theories has been 
prevalent throughout human history. We first illustrate historical incidents suggesting that 
societal crisis situations—defined as impactful and rapid societal change that calls established 
power structures, norms of conduct, or even the existence of specific people or groups, into 
question —have stimulated belief in conspiracy theories. We then review the psychological 
literature to explain why this is the case. Evidence suggests that the aversive feelings that people 
experience when in crisis—fear, uncertainty, the feeling of being out of control—stimulate a 
motivation to make sense of the situation, increasing the likelihood of perceiving conspiracies in 
social situations. We then explain that after being formed, conspiracy theories can become 
historical narratives that may spread through cultural transmission. We conclude that conspiracy 
theories originate particularly in crisis situations, and may form the basis for how people 
subsequently remember and mentally represent a historical event.   
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Conspiracy Theories as Part of History:  
The Role of Societal Crisis Situations 
 People continuously experience substantial uncertainty and fear due to societal crisis 
situations such as terrorist attacks, plane crashes, natural disasters, or war. While it is 
surprisingly difficult to provide an objective definition of “crisis” as a historical concept—this as 
labeling an event as a ‘crisis’ almost necessarily requires a subjective judgment, and the 
significance of an event to justify that label often can only be evaluated in retrospect (Roitman, 
2011)—in this contribution we utilize a working definition of societal crisis as impactful and 
rapid societal change that calls existing power structures, norms of conduct, or even the existence 
of specific people or groups, into question. Since people have a fundamental need to understand 
why events occurred, particularly in the case of negative or unexpected events (Brückmuller, 
Hegarty, Teigen, Boehm, & Luminet, this volume), crisis situations often elicit sense-making 
narratives among citizens that become part of their representations of history. Many of these 
narratives take the form of conspiracy theories, commonly defined as explanatory beliefs of how 
multiple actors meet in secret agreement in order to achieve a hidden goal that is widely 
considered to be unlawful or malevolent (Zonis & Joseph, 1994). Central in this definition is a 
group, or coalition, of powerful and evil-minded individuals, distinguishing conspiracy beliefs 
from other forms of belief (e.g., religion; paranormal belief; superstition). Whilst some 
conspiracy theories have turned out to be true (e.g., Watergate; the Iran-Contra scandal), most 
conspiracy theories in history have no evidence to support them (Pipes, 1997). Well-known 
examples of conspiracy theories as explanations of societal crises are allegations that the CIA 
was behind the assassination of JFK, or that the Bush administration was involved in plotting the 
9/11 terrorist attacks (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009).    
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In the present contribution, we focus on the role that societal crisis situations play in 
people’s tendency to believe in conspiracy theories, and the implications of this for how people 
make sense of, and remember, past events. We specifically examine if, and why, societal crisis 
situations stimulate belief in conspiracy theories. To do so, we integrate historical insights about 
crisis events that have taken place and stimulated conspiracy theories, with psychological 
insights about underlying mental processes leading to conspiracy beliefs. In the following, we 
first examine how prevalent conspiracy theories have been throughout history. Are conspiracy 
theories mainly a product of our modern, digital age, facilitated and perpetuated by Internet and 
social media? Or, have conspiracy theories been prevalent among citizens throughout history?  
As a second step, we provide examples in both near and distant history of how crisis situations 
were intimately connected to the appearance of, and widespread belief in, conspiracy theories. 
As a third step, we describe the underlying psychological dynamics of how crisis situations may 
stimulate belief in conspiracy theories. As a final step, we explain that once formed, conspiracy 
theories can stabilize into coherent narratives that influence how people remember, and think 
about, past events. 
Are Conspiracy Theories Unique to Our Modern Time? 
 A common idea among lay people, journalists, and academics seems to be that we now 
live in an “age of conspiracism”. To some extent, this assumption is understandable: Conspiracy 
theories can be found everywhere on the Internet, and statistics reveal that large portions of 
ordinary citizens endorse them for a wide range of topics (Oliver & Wood, 2014; Sunstein & 
Vermeule, 2009). As a consequence, both authors of this paper are regularly approached by 
journalists who typically ask if—or even downright assume that—conspiracy beliefs are “on the 
rise” in our current era. But is this actually true? What does the empirical evidence say about the 
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prevalence of conspiracy thinking over time? 
 In an admirable and exceptionally labor-intensive research project, Uscinski and Parent 
(2014) randomly selected a total of 104,803 published letters that US citizens sent to the New 
York Times and the Chicago Tribune between 1890 and 2010. These researchers, and a team of 
trained assistants, coded the letters for conspiratorial content. Each era has its own crisis 
situations, of course, and accordingly the content of specific conspiracy theories varied 
substantially over time. But more interesting was the prevalence of conspiracy theories: The 
extent to which these letters contained conspiracy theories fluctuated but did not increase over 
time. If anything, there were two spikes in the data suggesting increased conspiratorial content; 
however, these spikes were not in the current decade. The first spike occurred shortly before the 
year 1900, at the height of the second industrial revolution - a period that was characterized by 
the rise of major companies, quick technological progress, and rapidly changing power 
structures. Such major societal change is a recipe for feelings of insecurity among citizens, 
particularly those who feel powerless or voiceless (Hofstadter, 1966). The second spike occurred 
during the late 1940s and the early 1950s—a period that marked the beginning of the Cold War. 
Many of the conspiracy theories that were ventilated during that period assumed an association 
between groups or institutions with communism (e.g., McCarthyism). The core conclusion that 
emerges from these data is that conspiracy theories have not increased over time, and if there 
ever has been an “age of conspiracism”, it is not in the present decade. Uscinski and Parent 
reason that, insofar as the Internet plays a role in conspiracy theorizing, its role seems restricted 
to replacing other means of communication (e.g., word-of-mouth).        
 A comparable conclusion emerges from a study by Andeweg (2014), who studied how 
citizens feel about politicians, political parties, and democracy, within various EU countries. His 
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study specifically examined whether the trust that people have in politicians and political parties, 
and their satisfaction with the political system, has declined over time. The data on satisfaction 
with democracy ranges from 1974 to 2012, and the data on trust range from 1997 to 2012. The 
results suggest that although, across EU member states political trust and satisfaction tends to be 
low, it is not declining. There have been within-country fluctuations throughout the years, but 
these fluctuations seem mostly due to specific historical events (e.g., economic recession vs. 
prosperity), and do not reflect structural changes. Although Andeweg (2014) did not directly 
assess belief in conspiracy theories, measures of trust in, and satisfaction with, politicians have 
been found to closely predict such beliefs (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; 
Goertzel, 1994). Combined with Uscinski and Parent’s (2014) data, these findings offer little 
evidence for the proposition that conspiracy theories are unique to our digital age.  
 Furthermore, there is also little evidence to support the idea that conspiracy theories are 
specific to Western cultures. Studies have revealed substantial conspiracy theorizing among 
citizens around the world, including Eastern Europe (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012), Asia 
(Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2015; Swami, 2012), South Africa (Grebe & Nattrass, 2012),and the 
Middle East (Zonis & Joseph, 1994). A more plausible conclusion, therefore, is that a tendency 
to believe in conspiracy theories is part of human nature, and that people have been susceptible 
to such beliefs throughout history. We propose a fluid, situational factor to predict such beliefs, 
namely the presence versus absence of crisis situations. As each generation typically faces a 
range of societal crisis situations such as revolutions, wars, economic recessions, terrorist 
attacks, and natural disasters, this would explain why conspiracy theorizing has been prevalent 
throughout history. Furthermore, whilst no research has yet studied cultural differences in 
conspiracy belief, our line of reasoning suggests that possible cultural differences are likely to be 
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attributable to variations in the extent to which cultures experience uncertainty and fear (e.g., low 
vs. high trust cultures).  
Historical Crises and Conspiracy Theories 
 Various major crisis events have taken place in recent history, and these events have 
inspired substantial conspiracy theorizing. Only recently the world has seen economic and 
financial crises, which have been associated with various conspiracy theories (e.g., the theory 
that the financial crisis was caused by democratic bankers to get Obama elected in 2008). 
Furthermore, our world is facing a crisis pertaining to climate change, which has elicited a 
climate change denial movement, and conspiracy theories suggesting that climate change is a 
hoax. Various wars were fought (e.g., Iraq; Afghanistan), and the motives to participate in these 
wars have been questioned in conspiracy theories suggesting a prominent role of oil companies 
in secret political decision-making. Finally, the 9-11 terrorist attacks have produced conspiracy 
theories suggesting that the attacks were an inside job, or that the US government deliberately 
failed to prevent the attacks (Dunbar & Reagan, 2011). Thus, many crisis situations took place, 
and almost invariably, these crisis situations led large groups of citizens to embrace conspiracy 
theories. 
 While many conspiracy theories nowadays implicate governmental institutions (e.g., the 
CIA) or major companies (e.g., the pharmaceutical industry), various other societal groups have 
also frequently been implicated in conspiracy theories. One group that has often been accused of 
conspiracy formation is the Jewish population. Jewish conspiracy theories—suggesting for 
instance that there is a Jewish plot to achieve world domination—still fuel anti-Semitism in 
various parts of the world, such as Malaysia (Swami, 2012), Turkey (Nefes, 2015), and Poland 
(Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012). Such conspiratorial anti-Semitism is a recurring issue 
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throughout history. Back in the 1930s and 1940s, Jewish conspiracy theories were a major part 
of Hitler’s speeches, and a potent force in inspiring the Holocaust (Snyder, 2015). For instance, 
Hitler blamed the German defeat in WWI on a Jewish conspiracy. Furthermore, he believed that 
Soviet-communism was a Jewish conspiracy, a theory commonly referred to as “Judeo-
Bolshevism”. Somewhat ironically, Joseph Stalin entertained similar conspiracy theories, 
suggesting that the Jews were responsible for the rise of Nazism (for details on Jewish 
conspiracy theories shortly before and during WWII, see Pipes, 1997). Also in Medieval times 
the European Jewish population was a target of conspiracy theorizing, including being blamed 
for setbacks during the Crusades, and for causing disease epidemics such as the plague 
(Brotherton, 2015).  
 Even back in the Roman era there are prominent examples of conspiracy theories, and 
these are typically connected to major crisis situations. During the year 64 AD, the great fire of 
Rome erupted. Aided by the wind and the wooden construction of the houses, the fire lasted for 
almost a week, transforming Rome into an inferno. Once the fire stopped, most of Rome was 
destroyed. Many people died or were left homeless. Emperor Nero was out of town when the fire 
started, and returned to Rome to organize help for the victims. Around the same time, however, 
conspiracy theories started to spread, which asserted that Nero and his associates deliberately 
started the fire in order to rebuild Rome according to his own vision. In addition, these 
conspiracy theories stated that Nero was singing while Rome was burning (for a more elaborate 
description, see Brotherton, 2015). Apparently, Nero was not amused when hearing about the 
conspiracy theories. In response, he came up with his own conspiracy theory, blaming the 
Christian community for initiating the fire and spreading the rumors—leading many Christians to 
9 
Running Head: CONSPIRACY THEORIES 
be crucified or burned alive.1   
 One might reason that these examples are just anecdotes, and think of examples of 
conspiracy theories that appear unconnected to a specific societal crisis (e.g., the moon landings; 
the government hiding evidence for intelligent extraterrestrial life). However, whilst these latter 
conspiracy theories do not emerge from an objectively ‘real’ crisis, they do make assumptions of 
a powerful government that deceives citizens in a deliberate and highly ingenious fashion. Such 
conspiracy theories therefore still originate from subjective perceptions of a nation being in 
crisis. More important for the present purposes is that societal crisis situations almost invariably 
elicit conspiracy theories. These considerations suggest that conspiracy theories are initiated by 
the subjective thoughts and feelings that people have when confronted with societal crisis 
situations such as a fire, a disease epidemic, a war, a plane crash, or a terrorist strike. In the 
following section, we examine the psychological literature to answer the question of why 
conspiracy theories emerge in such contexts. 
The Psychology of Conspiracy Beliefs 
 What psychological function does believing in conspiracy theories have for perceivers, 
and how is this relevant in crisis situations? Conspiracy theories provide people with simplified 
answers, specifically to questions of how a certain crisis situation emerged, and which societal 
actors can and cannot be trusted. These answers are highly relevant for how people cope with 
crisis situations. Crisis situations are likely to have the psychological effect on people that they 
become uncertain, or feel that they cannot control their environment anymore. Conspiracy 
theories address these feelings by enabling precautionary actions to the alleged conspirators—
 
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The original historical source reporting the fire of Rome, the Nero conspiracy theory, and Nero’s 
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leading to increased vigilance that may be useful in exposing, combating, or avoiding the 
conspiracy. Put differently, a conspiracy theory helps people to make sense of the world by 
specifying the causes of important events, which further helps them predict, and anticipate, the 
future. Hofstadter (1966) noted that conspiracy theories help people comprehend complex events 
that are difficult to understand otherwise, by attributing these events to a powerful and evil 
enemy group. More generally, a desire to make sense of the world is a core motive underlying 
belief in conspiracy theories (see also Bale, 2007). Such sense-making is particularly likely to 
stimulate conspiracy beliefs in a social context that involves hostile or ideologically dissimilar 
outgroups. Such a competitive intergroup setting promotes a need to be vigilant given that the 
powerful outgroup may cause more harm in the future, and conspiracy beliefs enable perceivers 
to estimate what the outgroup is capable of.  
 It has been noted that people’s motivation to make sense of their environment increases 
when they feel that they are not in control of a situation, or when they experience subjective 
feelings of uncertainty (Van den Bos, 2009). The psychological concepts of lacking control and 
experiencing subjective uncertainty are closely interrelated, and both describe the aversive 
experience of being in situations where it is unclear what the future may hold. Such experiences 
are threatening, as people have a basic need to experience a certain level of control over their 
environment, and to know what to expect from that environment. Feelings of control and 
certainty enable people to effectively navigate the world by successfully seizing on 
opportunities, avoiding threats, and making good choices that contribute constructively to one’s 
wellbeing. When people are anxious and uncertain, they seek to restore control through enhanced 
cognitive activity to increase comprehension of the situation that they find themselves in (see 
also Park, 2010). Put differently, when people experience such aversive feelings they engage in 
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increased sense-making activities in order to imbue a situation with meaning and purpose.  
 If belief in conspiracy theories is a way of making sense of a situation, it follows that 
such beliefs are increasingly likely to the extent that people experience uncertainty or a lack of 
control. This assertion would provide an explanation for why conspiracy theories emerge in 
societal crisis situations: People often experience such situations as uncontrollable, and hence, 
they are a cause of substantial uncertainty and anxiety among citizens. Moreover, it is often easy 
to connect societal crises to the purposeful misdeeds of hostile groups, making it likely that many 
citizens consider the possibility of secret conspiracy formation. In a seminal psychological 
experiment, one group of research participants read a scenario where a president was shot and 
killed. Another group of participants read the same scenario with one difference, namely the 
assassin missed and the president survived. Subsequently, participants were asked to what extent 
they believed that a conspiratorial network was behind the attack: Was the assassination 
(attempt) the work of a lone wolf, or of a conspiracy? Results revealed that when the president 
was killed, people were more likely to believe a conspiracy was behind the attack than when the 
president survived (McCauley & Jacques, 1979). Other studies found further support for such 
“consequence-cause matching” in conspiracy beliefs, referring to the idea that people are more 
likely to believe in conspiracy theories to the extent that the consequences of an event are more 
harmful. For instance, LeBoeuf and Norton (2012) found that a political assassination was more 
likely attributed to a conspiracy if it led to a war than if it did not lead to a war. Such 
consequence-cause matching in conspiracy beliefs is due to an increased motivation to make 
sense of the event (Van Prooijen & Van Dijk, 2014).  
 These studies suggest that specific impactful societal events—such as the assassination of 
a president—produce specific conspiracy theories (i.e., about the assassination). Feelings of 
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uncertainty, and the fear of being out of control, also appear to predict a more general tendency 
to explain events that happen in the world through conspiracy theories, however, including 
conspiracy theories that are conceptually unrelated to the source of uncertainty (e.g., Kossowska 
& Bukowski, 2015). For instance, research suggests that people who have a relatively strong 
external locus of control—which is a structural tendency to attribute one’s own successes and 
failures to factors that are out of one’s own control—are more likely to report high levels of 
interpersonal mistrust, paranoia, and belief in conspiracy theories (Hamsher, Geller, & Rotter, 
1968; Mirowsky & Ross, 1983). Likewise, people who feel powerless are more likely to believe 
in conspiracy theories (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014), as are people who 
strongly experience fear of death (Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011).  
 The above findings are correlational, and hence, these studies do not reveal whether 
uncertainty causes conspiracy beliefs, or vice versa. In experimental psychological research, 
however, researchers have attempted to establish causality: Does the experience of lacking 
control, or subjective feelings of uncertainty, increase belief in conspiracy theories? To examine 
this question, various studies have attempted to induce these feelings in research participants. An 
example is a study by Whitson and Galinsky (2008), in which one group of research participants 
wrote down a past experience where they felt that they personally lacked control. Compared to 
other participants—who had written about a less threatening experience—these participants were 
subsequently more likely to believe in conspiracy theories that were unrelated to the out-of-
control experience (for other illustrations, see Sullivan, Landau, & Rothschild, 2010; Van 
Prooijen & Acker, 2015). Likewise, other studies asked participants to describe a situation in 
their life where they felt uncertain. Such an uncertainty induction subsequently increased belief 
in conspiracy theories about various societal issues, provided that the relevant authorities were 
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considered immoral (Van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; see also Van Prooijen, 2016). Taken 
together, these findings suggest that lacking control, or subjective uncertainty, often increases 
people’s tendency to believe in conspiracy theories.   
 The relationship between uncertainty and conspiracy beliefs has substantial implications 
for understanding how people psychologically cope with adversity in their everyday life. For 
instance, Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax, and Blaine (1999) investigated conspiracy beliefs among 
societal minority groups (i.e., African Americans). Their findings reveal that minority group 
members who face real problems—such as racial discrimination—are more likely than majority 
group members to attribute these problems to conspiracies. Furthermore, Van Prooijen and De 
Vries (2016) investigated organizational conspiracy beliefs: What factors predict whether or not 
employees suspect their managers of conspiring towards evil goals? Results of their study 
revealed that feelings of job insecurity—that is, uncertainty about whether one’s job will 
continue to exist in the future—was a main predictor of such organizational conspiracy beliefs 
(see also Douglas and Leite, in press, for studies on conspiracy beliefs in organizations). These 
findings underscore that in a variety of settings, subjectively experiencing uncertainty or 
powerlessness is a recipe for conspiracy beliefs.   
 Whilst conspiracy beliefs are a response to anxiety and uncertainty, it is not a given that 
they actually help to reduce such feelings. In fact, research reveals that exposure to conspiracy 
theories increases feelings of powerlessness, which in turn leads to a variety of maladaptive 
behavioral intentions such as withdrawal from politics, a decreased willingness to reduce one’s 
carbon footprint (in response to climate conspiracy belief), a decreased willingness to have a 
child vaccinated (in response to vaccine conspiracy beliefs; Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, 2014b; see 
also Douglas & Sutton, 2015).  Conspiracy theories also appear to influence people without their 
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awareness (Douglas & Sutton, 2008). We speculate here that conspiracy theories are likely to 
have some psychological payoff for perceivers, for instance by reassuring them that harmful 
incidents do not occur at random, thereby enabling them to prepare for the dangers entailed by 
the suspected conspiracy. At the same time, believing that the world is filled with evil 
conspiracies is likely to invoke a host of negative emotions, which may help explain why belief 
in one conspiracy theory stimulates belief in other conspiracy theories (Goertzel, 1994; Wood, 
Douglas, & Sutton, 2012).  
 In sum, belief in conspiracy theories is intimately connected with feelings of fear, 
uncertainty, or being out of control, and it is likely that societal crisis situations often arouse such 
feelings in people. As such, these insights can explain why conspiracy theories flourish 
particularly in societal crisis situations. The main underlying process for this connection is that 
uncertainty stimulates a desire to make sense of one’s social environment.  
Implications for Historical Narratives 
 What are the implications of these psychological processes for how people remember and 
transmit information about past events? Here, we propose that whilst conspiracy theories may 
originate through the emotional processes of lacking control or feeling uncertain, at a relatively 
fast pace they can become coherent narratives that shape people’s representations of history. The 
feature of conspiracy theories that they summarize complex events into a simplified story—
typically involving a powerful enemy group (i.e., the conspiracy) that deliberately organizes and 
carries out an evil plan—makes such theories ideally suited for cultural transmission as they are 
easily understood by lay people. It has been noted that people typically make sense of past events 
as “lay historians” who—unlike professional historians—rarely base their conclusions on direct 
historical sources. Instead, lay historians transmit historical narratives to others based on their 
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imperfect memory, as well as on other imperfect sources of information such as folklore, novels, 
films, and the like (see Klein, 2013).  
 As a consequence, conspiracy theories may spread over time and become part of people’s 
mental representations of important historical events, long after the feelings of uncertainty and 
fear that the events initially caused have dissipated. A case in point is the assassination of JFK on 
22 November 1963 in Dallas, Texas. This event produced an instant shock in the USA, and 
indeed, in the entire world. For many people, the JFK assassination continues to be a “flashbulb 
memory”, as they still know exactly where they were and what they were doing when they first 
heard the news (see also Luminet & Spijkerman, this volume). The event also gave rise to major 
conspiracy theories, making allegations that powerful groups such as the CIA, the KGB, Cuba, 
or organized crime were behind the assassination. Various polls suggest that ever since this event 
took place, the majority of US citizens have believed in one of the conspiracy theories about this 
event (Pipes, 1997).  
Of particular interest for the present purposes is how the proportion of citizens that 
endorsed a JFK conspiracy theory has developed over time. Longitudinal Gallup-polling 
revealed that, in the three years directly after the assassination, slightly more than 50% of US 
citizens believed that JFK had been murdered as part of a conspiracy (see Swift, 2013, for an 
overview of these Gallup polls). It stands to reason that, after these first few years, the 
uncertainty and fear that were caused by the Kennedy assassination had dissipated among the 
public. There were various other societal crises going on to worry about (e.g., the Vietnam War; 
substantial societal changes, such as those initiated by civil rights movements). Nevertheless, the 
proportion of citizens that believed in a JFK conspiracy theory gradually increased over the 
years, reaching a high of 81% in 1975. In the following years, up until 2003, these proportions 
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remained consistently above 70%, and peaked again at 81% in the early 2000s. Only in recent 
years these numbers have started to decrease, although they are currently still above 60%—
which is higher than directly after JFK assassination itself (Swift, 2013).  
Whilst uncertainty and fear may have contributed to the genesis of JFK conspiracy 
theories back in 1963, it is difficult to account for these numbers through these emotional 
processes. There has been variation in the number of crises throughout the past few decades that 
citizens encountered (e.g., economic recession vs. prosperity; war vs. peace), but this waxing and 
waning of societal crises are not visible in the Gallup figures (Swift, 2013). Furthermore, taking 
into account that the figures are very high also in recent years, it is quite likely that many people 
who were not even born in 1963 endorse a JFK conspiracy theory. Instead, we propose that 
conspiracy theories can become coherent historical narratives that are transmitted to future 
generations as if they were facts, even if the actual facts do not provide compelling evidence for 
the conspiracy theory. What starts as a psychological response to cope with distressing feelings 
can become part of people’s representations of history.    
Not all conspiracy theories make history this way, and in fact, the plausibility that people 
accord to certain conspiracy theories can also decrease over time as a function of new insights. 
For instance, it was common for citizens to believe that many young women conspired as 
witches with the Devil back in the 17th Century, and this conspiracy theory in all likelihood 
emerged through similar processes as other conspiracy theories discussed in this paper. 
Nevertheless, it is a safe guess that few modern European citizens would endorse such beliefs 
today (although comparable witchcraft conspiracy theories are still common in other parts of the 
world, e.g., parts of Africa; West & Sanders, 2003). In a similar vein, we can only speculate as to 
how JFK conspiracy theories will develop in the future—particularly when the final classified 
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documents about this incident are released to the public. Be that as it may, our conclusion is that 
whilst conspiracy theories are initially based on the emotional experiences associated with 
imminent crisis situations, they may soon after stabilize into coherent narratives that are part of 
how people remember the past.   
Concluding remarks 
 This contribution sought to examine the relationship between societal crisis situations and 
belief in conspiracy theories. Building on an integration of historical observations with basic 
psychological research, we can draw the following conclusions. First, conspiracy theories are not 
unique to our current time or culture. People of all eras and cultures are likely to believe in 
conspiracy theories, provided that they are confronted with societal crisis situations. Second, this 
relationship between societal crisis situations and belief in conspiracy theories is attributable to 
feelings of fear, uncertainty, and being out of control. These feelings instigate sense-making 
processes that increase the likelihood that people perceive conspiracies in their social 
environment. Third, after being formed, conspiracy theories can become part of lay 
representations of history, and are transmitted to new generations as coherent narratives even 
though people do not experience uncertainty about past crisis situations anymore. Taken 
together, these processes might explain why human history is replete with widespread belief in 
conspiracy theories.   
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